Saudi Shi'ites: New light on an old divide

Interview by Mahan Abedin

Fouad Ali al-Ibrahim was born in Safwa, eastern Saudi Arabia, in 1960. He joined the Islamic Revolution Organization in 1980 and served in its central committee until 1993. Currently, Ibrahim is a leading member of the National Coalition for Democracy in Saudi Arabia and continues to oppose the Saudi regime from London. From 1988-90 Ibrahim was on the editorial team of Al-Thawrah al-Islamiyah (The Islamic Revolution) and from 1991-93 he was the editor of Al-Jazeera al-Arabiyah (The Arabian Peninsula). Both publications belonged to the Shi'ite opposition. Ibrahim is the author of The Shi'ites of Saudi Arabia (Saqi, 2006). He holds a PhD in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from London's School of Oriental and African Studies.

Mahan Abedin: How do you account for the rise of Saudi Shi'ite political consciousness in the modern era?

Fouad Ibrahim: The main factor was the relationship between the Shi'ites and the Saudi state. This relationship has never been based on anything even remotely resembling the concept of modern citizenship. It has always been based on the concepts of forced annexation and extreme oppression. This is why the Shi'ites have never felt part of the Saudi state. This goes back to the foundation of the first Saudi state in the middle of the 18th century

MA: So basically the historic Shi'ite narrative in the peninsula revolves around oppression and alienation?

FI: Yes, but there is also an external factor relating to the flooding of foreign workers to the Eastern Province, many of whom worked for Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco). These foreign Arab workers imported Arab nationalist ideology to the Eastern Province and managed to win over the loyalties of many local Shi'ites. They contributed to the development of Shi'ite political consciousness. In fact the Shi'ites of the Eastern Province have constituted the base for many opposition movements in the region.

MA: Has the area now known as the Eastern Province been Shi'ite since the beginning of Islamic history?

FI: Yes! Actually Shi'ism has been the most indigenous form of Islam in the region. It was the Shi'ites of our region that traveled to Iraq and Iran and won over many converts to their faith. For instance Sheikh Ibrahim al-Qatifi, among others from Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain, played prominent roles in the Shi'ite conversion of Iran in the early Safavid period of the 16th century.

MA: Given this prolific proselytism, why have the Shi'ite remained a minority in the peninsula?

FI: Dividing the Saudi state into minorities and a majority is a misconception. Saudi Arabia is a state of minorities. Dividing Saudi Arabia along Sunni/Shi'ite lines will not work, as the Wahhabis do not even recognize the Sunnis as true Muslims.

MA: They recognize Hanbalis.

FI: That is the only mazhab [religious school] which they recognize. They accuse all the others of innovation and deviation. But even the Wahhabis are not a majority in Saudi Arabia.

MA: But what about the Hanbalis?

FI: You could say the Hanbalis constitute the biggest minority in Saudi Arabia.

MA: From a Shi'ite perspective, is the modern Saudi state legitimate?

FI: From a purely ideological point of view, the Saudi state (like other states) is illegitimate on account of its preemption of the Imam Mahdi's utopian state. But since the Islamic revolution in Iran, which promoted new forms of Shi'ite political thought, the Shi'ites of the Eastern Province have accepted the legitimacy of temporal states, provided they are just in their application of the sharia. But of course, the Saudi state is anything but just and merciful.

MA: Broadly speaking, are the Shi'ites loyal to the Saudi nation-state?

FI: We need to distinguish between loyalty to the homeland and loyalty to the state. The Saudi state has three parochial components: the al-Saud royal family, a broader Najdi constituency and the Wahhabi sect. These are the components of national identity in the kingdom. It has been successful in Najd, but it has failed in every other region because the inhabitants do not identify with this imposed identity. In that sense, Saudi Arabia is not a nation-state. With regards to the Shi'ites, we have not developed a sense of Saudi citizenship because of the extreme forms of oppression we have faced. When the state transgresses your basic rights, how can you develop loyalty to it?

MA: Let's talk about Shi'ite organizations. How important was the Harakat al-Risaliyin al-Tala’ (Movement of Vanguards Missionaries - MVM) to the political development of Saudi Shi'ites?

FI: Our organization, Munazamat al-Thawrah al-Islamiyah [the Islamic Revolution Organization - IRO], was affiliated to the MVM from the outset. The MVM was the mother organization for a number of movements in the region, especially in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

MA: Why has there been so little coverage on the MVM, both from journalistic and academic perspectives?

FI: The MVM was inclined towards secrecy. In fact until 1993 nobody knew much about its activities, especially in Iraq and Bahrain. For instance, observers did not know that it was the MVM which organized the failed coup against the ruling dynasty in Bahrain in December 1981.

MA: I'll come to the failed Bahrain coup later. Is the MVM still operational?

FI: No, they are not. After the ending of the Iran-Iraq War [1988] the leaders of the movement reassessed the situation and formed new conclusions. There was deep disappointment about Iran's failure to emerge as the outright winner. There was also resentment in some sections of the movement about the over-concentration on Iraq. Many activists felt that the movement should have divided its attention equally between the other regional countries.

MA: At its height, how big was the MVM in terms of numbers of activists?

FI: It was very big.

MA: How big?

FI: We are talking thousands. It was the biggest Shi'ite Islamist movement of its time.

MA: What happened to the movement?

FI: As far as its Saudi branch is concerned, the October 1993 pact with the Saudi regime obligated Shi'ite activists to dissolve the Reform Movement and to formally and practically dissociate itself from outside movements. It should be mentioned that the IRO had transformed into al-Haraka Islahiyah (the Reform Movement) in 1991.

MA: How decisive was the leadership of Hassan al-Safar to both the MVM and IRO?

FI: Sheikh Hassan al-Safar is widely regarded as a spiritual leader of the Shi'ite movement in the Arabian Peninsula. His strongest point was his ability to relate to the people. Because of his ideological training he was able to transform historical Shi'ite narratives into effective populist themes. But this does not mean that he is an intellectual.

MA: To what extent did the Muharram Intifada of 1979 transform the relationship between Shi'ite dissenters and the Saudi regime?

FI: This was a major turning point in the relationship between the Shi'ites and the Saudi regime. It changed everything.

MA: Reading your book [The Shi'ites of Saudi Arabia], it is clear that it was also a personal turning point for you because you witnessed the shooting to death of your cousin. Did many others experience the same kind of psychological transformation?

FI: The events of Muharram in 1979 left a deep scar in the consciousness of the majority of Shi'ites in the Eastern Province.

MA: But given that Shi'ites had experienced extreme oppression for hundreds of years, why did this turning point occur so late in the day? I say this because the demonstrations of Muharram in 1979 were not huge, nor did they result in many casualties.

FI: There had been clashes between Shi'ites and the authorities for decades. For instance, in the 1920s a Shi'ite revolt was led by Sheikh Mohammed al-Nemr. In the 1950s and 1960s the Shi'ite workers of Aramco staged demonstrations, mostly in support of Arab nationalism. But the events of 1979 must be understood in the context of the ideological transformation of Shi'ism itself. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran represented the culmination of the revolutionary political thought of Shariati, Jalal al-Ahmad and Imam [Ruhollah] Khomeini. The Islamic Revolution in Iran turned the old Shi'ite belief in the illegitimacy of temporal states on its head.

MA: What were the main inspirational features of the Iranian revolution to the Shi'ites of the Eastern Province?

FI: The most attractive feature was the leadership of Imam Khomeini. The Imam's charismatic features were truly extraordinary and resonated deeply with all Muslims, particularly the Shi'ites. Second, the new interpretation of Shi'ite political thought inspired by the Iranian revolution was highly liberating. Third, the Shi'ites of the peninsula deeply appreciate the independence of Islamic Iran. They compare the Islamic Republic to the Saudi regime, which is dependent on America for its basic security. Fourth, the leadership of the Iranian revolution had good links to the leadership of the MVM and this had fostered familiarity and mutual respect.

MA: Given the close relations between the MVM and the new Islamic regime in Iran, do you think Iran had a hand in the Bahrain coup attempt of December 1981?

FI: No! Iran had nothing to do with that venture whatsoever. In fact the Iranians paid the price for that mistake.

MA: Did the coup plotters really think they could succeed?

FI: They were convinced it could succeed. They thought they could rely on supporters inside Bahrain.

MA: Were you aware of the plot?

FI: No, I was in South Korea at the time.

MA: Who foiled the plot; was it the Bahrainis or the Saudis?

FI: It was the Bahrainis. Apparently the coup plotters made many mistakes during the preparatory stage and this alerted the Bahraini authorities.

MA: Where were the coup plotters from?

FI: They were mostly from Iraq. They were led by Hadi Modarresi.

MA: The Saudis have long alleged that the IRO was financed by Iran; is this true?

FI: No, it is not. We have always had a number of financial sources. The Shi'ite of the Eastern Province live in the most oil-rich region in the world. Moreover, as Shi'ites we have khums [voluntary Islamic tax] as a major source of revenue. Furthermore, we have other contributions in the form of tabarowat [donations]. In fact it is the people of the Eastern Province that regularly send money to Iran in the form of khums ... They also support Shi'ite Islamic causes and organizations in Iraq and Lebanon.

MA: Then what kind of assistance were the Iranians providing to your organization?

FI: Mostly moral support. But they also helped materially, especially in terms of logistics, offices and other buildings. But Iran had nothing to do with our activities. They never financed our activities.

MA: So the Iranians never interfered in your work, even in a subtle way?

FI: No, never!

MA: How much of your organization was based in Iran?

FI: The majority of our members were based in Iran until 1988.

MA: How about Saudi Hezbollah; do you believe they were behind the Khobar bombing [in Saudi Arabia] of 1996, as the Americans allege? [Nineteen 19 US servicemen and one Saudi were killed.]

FI: The Americans always raise this issue whenever they have problems with Iran.

MA: But they accused Iran of involvement in that attack from the outset. My question is do you believe Iran and its militant Shi'ite allies in the Kingdom were behind the attack?

FI: The Americans accused Iran and the Shi'ites initially but later on they realized they were very wrong.

MA: Who do you think was responsible for that attack?

FI: It was probably carried out by a group associated to al-Qaeda.

MA: Why did the Americans initially blame Iran; was it a case of faulty intelligence or pure politics?

FI: It was politics through and through! Some in the American intelligence community may have genuinely suspected Iran of involvement, but as I said earlier, in due course they realized they had been very wrong. In fact the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] interrogated a Shi'ite activist, Hani al-Sayegh, who had been handed over to them in June 1997 by the Canadian security services, but they gleaned nothing useful from his interrogation. So they released him and then deported him to Saudi Arabia! The Americans are well aware that the Shi'ites of the peninsula are not into terrorism

MA: But surely you don't deny that Shi'ites from the Eastern Province have been involved in acts of political violence.

FI: There have been a few cases, but these have been on a very low scale.

MA: Have people been killed as a result of these actions?

FI: Not to my knowledge.

MA: What targets were they attacking?

FI: Mainly the oil industry. But we are talking about minor acts of sabotage, not major acts of terrorism.

MA: Let's talk about the 1993 pact between the Saudi government and the Shi'ite opposition. What were the main factors that led to a meeting between then-king Fahd and the leaders of the Shi'ite Reform Movement in October 1993?

FI: There was a new political climate in the region after the Gulf War of 1991. People were demanding their rights. This was reinforced by international pressures for reform. Moreover, the explosion of Sunni dissent in the kingdom in the aftermath of the Gulf War seriously unsettled the regime. Some elements in the regime felt they should make peace with the Shi'ites in order to concentrate on defeating Sunni dissidents. They were fearful of Shi'ite activists finding common grounds with the neo-Salafi dissidents.

MA: Why did they suspect that?

FI: We were in contact with Saad al-Faqih, Mohammed al-Massari and others in the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Saudi security was probably monitoring these conversations and subsequently formed certain conclusions. These conclusions informed the regime's conciliatory approach towards the Shi'ite activists.

MA: To what extent did the new moderation of the Shi'ite movement influence the Saudi government's approach?

FI: The new reformist discourse was crucial in the Saudi decision to engage. Moreover, our shift towards modern forms of citizenship and pluralism allayed the fears of many quarters, including Saudi liberals and nationalists and also Western governments.

MA: Leaving aside its implementation, do you think the main terms of the 1993 accord were broadly acceptable to the Shi'ite opposition?

FI: Yes, as long as they led to the restoration of the legitimate rights of our people.

MA: Briefly, what were the main terms of the agreement?

FI: The main terms consisted of the abolition of discriminatory practices against the Shi'ites in the political, economic and socio-cultural fields.

MA: What did the Saudis want in return?

FI: We had to stop all political activities.

MA: What do you mean?

FI: We had to stop all political activities outside the kingdom. The Saudis issued a general amnesty and offered to renew the passports of our activists.

MA: When you say they promised to end discrimination, does that include general social discrimination? I am referring to discrimination against the Shi'ites by non-state actors in the country.

FI: No, it only referred to government discrimination.

MA: What mechanisms did the government set out to implement this anti-discrimination program?

FI: King Fahd said he would order all government institutions to comply with this policy and added that it would then be up to us to follow up with these institutions.

MA: Thirteen years on, to what extent has the accord been implemented?

FI: Discrimination is still widespread.

MA: Are you saying that every Saudi institution continues to discriminate against the Shi'ites?

FI: Yes!

MA: So nothing has improved in these 13 years?

FI: The only promise they kept was the security of the exiles who returned in 1993. And any improvement in the situation of the Shi'ites is not as a result of the 1993 accord, but the changing situation in the country and the region more broadly. The regime is no longer in a position to crack down as harshly as it wishes.

MA: What are Sheikh Hassan al-Safar and other leaders doing in Qatif right now?

FI: They conduct their own religious and social activities.

MA: They are not engaged in politics?

FI: If you consider meeting government officials as political activity, then they are politically active as well!

MA: But what about the Shi'ite opposition outside the country?

FI: The Shi'ite opposition is still active but we are not as united as before.

MA: What caused the divisions?

FI: The 1993 accord was the main factor.

MA: Were you strongly against the accord?

FI: Yes, I was.

MA: To what extent is the Shi'ite opposition cooperating with other forms of dissent in the Kingdom? Are you talking to the liberals and the Sunni Islamists?

FI: I can honestly say that our old movement was the most inclusive and nationalist in the country. We went out of our way to cultivate links with other political forces. We still maintain good connections to liberals, nationalists, leftists and moderate Salafis. We have always been very open, but the problem is with the extremists. I personally have tried hard to initiate dialogue with the hardline Wahhabis. I succeeded with Salman al-Auda, who has now moderated his views on the Shi'ites.

MA: What about [Salafi] Safar al-Hawali?

FI: I contacted one of his friends to inquire into the feasibility of opening dialogue. But his friend advised me not to contact Hawali since he is still very radical and is not yet ready for dialogue with the Shi'ites.

MA: Do you think that neo-Salafism is the strongest form of opposition to the Saudis?

FI: Absent a national culture, any opposition will be reduced to a sectarian, tribal or regional phenomenon. I don't think you can talk about any general opposition to the Saudis. This is arguably the regime's greatest fortune.

MA: Is the regime capable of reform?

FI: I think gradual reforms will eventually lead to the fracture of the state. If they want to avoid this scenario they have to start promoting serious reforms; for instance transforming the royal family into a constitutional monarchy.

MA: Do you really think they would even consider such a subversive idea?

FI: No, I don't. This is a royal family that believes it owns everything in the country; even the air that people breathe!

MA: Is Abdullah an asset or liability to the House of Saud?

FI: Abdullah is just a figurehead.

MA: But he has been in charge for 10 years!

FI: But he can't do anything. Princes Sultan and Nayef have more power than Abdullah, especially in internal affairs. Abdullah is just the friendly face of the regime to the outside world.

MA: What would happen to the country in the event of the demise of the al-Saud?

FI: The country would fragment along regional lines. Hejaz and Najd will become independent states. The southern regions may be annexed by Yemen. The Eastern Province will definitely secede as well.