The model of what not to do

Abbas Kadhim *Calling It Like It Is*: "A most caustic concurrence
Three years on, Iraq, argues Abbas Kadhim*, has become the model of what not to do

Three years ago, a coalition of mainly American and British forces made its way into Iraq along the same path of previous invasions, the south. Once again, the Shia were subjected to the hard test of a three-fold dilemma. While they did not want to die defending Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime, they were not very excited about the prospects of the imminent Anglo-American invasion of their land. The third dimension of their quandary was inspired by their 1991 experience with broken American promises, for which they paid the heaviest price among other Iraqis. Unlike the Kurds who were given a safe enclave in the north, the Shia were thrown to the wolves with complete indifference. This time around, American affirmations, pronounced by yet another George Bush, were shrugged off. The march through Iraq was not a 'cake-walk' as self-appointed Iraqi opposition leaders with nominal affiliation with the country and a cursory knowledge of the real Shia sentiments prophesied.

Shocked and awed by the malfunction of their own 'shock and awe' strategy, many supporters of invading Iraq jumped out of the sinking ship leaving the Bush administration scrambling for any ideas to contain a situation that was clearly spinning out of control. Adding insult to injury, months of rigorous and quite expensive search throughout the country turned no weapons of mass destruction and aside from some retired trouble- makers, there was evidence pertaining to real links between regime and any anti-American terrorism.

Indeed, the open-border policy in the first months following the invasion turned Iraq into a nest of what may as well be a chronic problem for many decades to come. The collapse of the two selling excuses for the i"